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1	Jeffrey A. LeVee (State Bar No. 12586	53)
2	Jeffrey A. LeVee (State Bar No. 12586 Emma Killick (State Bar No. 192469) Sean W. Jaquez (State Bar No. 223132	
3	JONES DAY 555 West Fifth Street, Suite 4600	
4	Los Angeles, CA 90013-1025 Telephone: (213) 489-3939 Facsimile: (213) 243-2539	
5	Facsimile: (213) 243-2539	
6	Joe Sims (admitted <i>pro hac vice</i> ) JONES DAY	i a
7	51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.	TOUR 30
8	Washington, D.C. 20001-2113 Telephone: (202) 879-3939 Facsimile: (202) 626-1700	30
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10	Attorneys for Defendant INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBER	S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S
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12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
13	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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15	REGISTERSITE.COM, et al.,	Case No. CV-04-1368 ABC (CWx)
16	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT INTERNET
17	V.	CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED
18	INTERNET CORPORATION FOR	NAMES AND NUMBERS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
19	ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, et al.,	MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS
20	Defendants.	OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE
21		A CLAIM UNDER FRCP 12(B)(6)
22		Date: July 12, 2004
23		Time: 10:00 a.m.
24		Dept: 680
25		Honorable Audrey B. Collins
26		
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28		
	LAI-2116446v1	ICANN'S OPP. TO MOTION TO STRIKE CV-04-1368 ABC (CWx)

## **INTRODUCTION**

In an attempt to divert the Court's attention from their insufficient pleading, Plaintiffs bring an extremely unusual Motion to Strike Portions of Defendant Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers' ("ICANN") Motion to Dismiss Certain Causes of Action for Failure to State a Claim Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ("Motion to Strike"). Plaintiffs' motion is frivolous and should be denied.

## **ARGUMENT**

# I. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE IS BASELESS AND UNNECESSARY.

Plaintiffs seek an order striking certain portions of ICANN's Motion to
Dismiss on the grounds that those portions are not supported by a declaration or
other written evidence. This request is baseless and Plaintiffs' filing is a gross
waste of time. The portions of ICANN's Motion that offend Plaintiffs are not
"factual contentions;" rather, they consist of argument, a case comparison, and
statements that flow logically or obviously from Plaintiffs' allegations. These sorts
of statements are well within the scope of permissible argument and advocacy.
Plaintiffs make no effort to show that the referenced statements constitute facts as
opposed to argument.

Moreover, even if the statements were borderline factual in nature, Plaintiffs' motion would still be unjustified. First, since a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must, as a

The statements in the fourth paragraph follow logically and obviously from the fact that VeriSign has exclusive control over the authoritative database of .com domain name registrations (FAC  $\P$  4.9). Because RegisterSite does control that database it is simply not capable of giving someone the right to or access to a .com domain name. Thus, it cannot offer a guarantee.

ICANN'S OPP. TO MOTION TO STRIKE CV-04-1368 ABC (CWx)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For example, the first two statements are taken from the introduction to the brief. Both are arguments regarding what ICANN believes to be true. Mot. to Strike at 2:15-17 ("Each of the four claims . . . arises entirely from that same WLS Proposal and ICANN's failure to use its contracts with VeriSign to reject that proposal"); *id.* at 2:18-20 ("this lawsuit was apparently filed merely as a tactic to try to delay the implementation of WLS . . .").

matter of law, be decided based solely on allegations in the complaint and matters 1 judicially noticed, the Court is already prohibited from considering any other 2 matters. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 3 4 2001); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986). 5 Plaintiffs motion is, therefore, entirely superfluous because it asks the Court to do 6 that which it is already obligated to do. And Local Rule 7-6, the purported basis for 7 Plaintiffs' motion, has no application with respect to Rule 12(b)(6) motions; that 8 rule pertains to motions where declarations and written evidence are submitted and 9 the Court must consider facts. 10 Finally, to the extent that any of the statements that offend Plaintiffs is 11

factual or quasi-factual, its inclusion in the brief is harmless. None of the points is dispositive of any issue. Virtually all briefs contain statements that one's opponent could deem "factual contentions." Indeed, Plaintiffs 'opposition to ICANN's motion is vulnerable to such a challenge because plaintiffs make unsupported assertions that are clearly false. Opp. at 10: 20-21("The WLS lottery would not exist if ICANN had not authorized it"); id. at 17:21-22 ("Judge Walter[] determin[ed] that the Dotster plaintiffs did a poor job of presenting their own evidence"). But if every line of every brief was subject to a motion to strike, courts would have to spend an inordinate amount of time parsing through briefs making judgment calls about which statements deserve to be stricken and which can remain. It is for this reason that motions to strike are given "disfavored status" and "courts often require a showing of prejudice by the moving party" before granting such motions. State of California Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs have made no showing of prejudice, and indeed there is none. //

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## **CONCLUSION** For the foregoing reasons, ICANN respectfully requests that this Court deny Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike. **JONES DAY** Dated: June 30, 2004 Attorneys for Defendant INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS

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#### PROOF OF SERVICE BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 555 West Fifth Street, Suite 4600, Los Angeles, California 90013-1025. On June 30, 2004, I deposited with Federal Express, a true and correct copy of the within documents:

DEFENDANT ICANN'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER FRCP 12(B)(6)

in a sealed envelope, addressed as follows:

Derek A. Newman, Esq. NEWMAN & NEWMAN, Attorneys at Law 505 Fifth Avenue, South, Suite 610 Seattle, WA 98104 Laurence Hutt, Esq. ARNOLD & PORTER 777 S. Figueroa, 44th Fl., Los Angeles, CA 90017

Frederick F. Mumm, Esq. DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 865 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, CA 900017

Following ordinary business practices, the envelope was sealed and placed for collection by Federal Express on this date, and would, in the ordinary course of business, be retrieved by Federal Express for overnight delivery on this date.

I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.

Executed on June 30, 2004, at Los Angeles, California.

Elba B. Alonso de Ortega